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1. Introduction
The recent global economic developments have revived the interest on the propagation
mechanisms of economic shocks among European countries. The transmission of business
cycle shocks among member–states is now becoming of major interest and concern, given
that the effects of the debt crisis are still rippling through the European economy. To this
end, there is an ongoing discussion concerning the origins of the European crisis among
member–states. Yet, there is only anecdotal evidence as to which country was responsible
for initiating this crisis, as well as, on how shocks are transmitted both within and between
European economies.
This research contributes to the understanding of the relationships among business cycle
fluctuations, as well as, to the analysis of the origins of business cycle shocks and their
associated repercussions. In particular, we examine the extent of cyclical interdependencies
among the EU15 member–countries over the period 1977–2012, using the novel spillover
index approach of Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012). The chosen period allows us to examine
these interdependencies over a span of time where many significant economic events took
place in Europe but also globally (e.g. the financial crisis of 1987, the collapse of the Soviet
Union in 1989, the ERM II crisis in 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the inception of the EMU
in 1999, the Great Recession of 2007–2009 and the ongoing European Debt crisis that begun
in the late 2009).
Research on business cycles can be traced back in time to the work of Mitchell (1927),
Burns and Mitchell (1946), Kuznets (1958), Mundell (1961) and McKinnon (1963). Investi-
gating the factors that drive fluctuating levels of economic activity, as well as, purporting to
decipher the forces that determine the duration of business cycles became a rather promis-
ing field of research and gained much prominence especially during the 1990s when it was
initially established that output fluctuations in both industrialised and developing countries
share many common characteristics (see, inter alia, Backus et al., 1993; Gregory and Smith,
1996; Baxter and King, 1999; Lumsdaine and Prasad, 2003; Kose et al., 2003). A thorough
description of the relevant literature can be found in Inklaar et al. (2008) and Papageorgiou
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et al. (2010).
The importance of European business cycle synchronisation lies on the fact that it is a
pre-requisite for the smooth and efficient operation of monetary policy within a currency-
union. Indicatively we quote Rogoff (1985), Gertler et al. (1999), Fidrmuc and Korhonen
(2006), as well as, Savva et al. (2010), who among others put forward the argument that
unless business cycles within the currency union are synchronised, then asymmetric shocks
that will hit each individual economy (or asymmetric individual responses to symmetric
shocks) will inevitably lead to predicaments in a uniform monetary policy implementation
and to destabilisation.
However, making inferences about economic phenomena is rarely as simple as it initially
appears and empirical evidence can at times be contradicting. Thus, the current literature
of the European business cycle synchronisation has produced inconclusive findings. In par-
ticular, many authors (see, inter alia, Fatas, 1997; Angeloni and Dedola, 1999; Belo, 2001;
Altavilla, 2004; Weyerstrass et al., 2011) argue that higher levels of synchronisation can
indeed be reported early on in the 1990s. Even more, some provide evidence that cyclical
interdependencies have increased even further with the establishment of the EMU (see, in-
ter alia, Gayer, 2007; Darvas and Szapry, 2008; Michaelides et al., 2013). De Pace (2013)
pertaining to both the globalisation and the currency union effects on business cycle syn-
chronisation, also reports that the establishment of the European Monetary Union (EMU)
in 1999 was followed by clear evidence of higher correlations among the business cycles of
certain European countries.
Contrary to the exponents of business cycle convergence due to the establishment of
currency-union, other authors voice the opinion that what happened in the years that fol-
lowed the establishment of the EMU was actually quite the opposite. To begin with, Lehwald
(2012) argues that higher levels of cyclical interdependence are a fact only for core European
economies rather than for the whole EMU member countries. Along a similar vein, authors
such as Hallett and Richter (2008) and Crespo-Cuaresma and Ferna´ndez-Amador (2013)
provide evidence to suggest that since the adoption of the common currency, business cycles
among European member–countries have become rather divergent. Lee (2012, 2013) further
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reports that the degree of synchronisation among European countries was actually higher
before the EMU. On a final note regarding the EMU, Canova et al. (2012) in a recent study
opine that researchers should be very cautious when linking developments in the behaviour
of European cyclical interdependencies to institutional changes in Europe.
A recent strand of the literature examines the effects of the latest financial crisis on
synchronisation levels in Europe. Authors such as Gaechter et al. (2012) and Gomez et al.
(2012) in analysing a group of European countries for the period during and after the Great
Recession provide evidence that, since the outbreak of the crisis, the prevailing pattern
was the decoupling of business cycles. On top of that, some studies stress the necessity
to investigate not only the contemporaneous synchronisation of business cycles but also
their lead/lag relationship (see, for instance Darvas and Szapry, 2008; Gouveia and Correia,
2008; Weyerstrass et al., 2011, among others), which refers to the transmission mechanisms
of business cycle shocks. In this regard, empirical research should also turn its focus to
spillover effects among business cycles.
Business cycle shocks may be transmitted across economies via four main channels. In
short, there is the trade channel, the exchange rate channel, the financial integration channel,
as well as, the confidence channel (Eickmeier, 2007). More specifically, the trade channel
is explained on the basis of higher exports in one country as a result of higher demand
for imports in another country (Canova and Dellas, 1993; Kose and Yi, 2006). According
to Clark and van Wincoop (2001) and Calderon et al. (2007) this channel is of particular
importance to EMU countries, as monetary unions tend to foster trade among their members.
Furthermore, Calderon et al. (2007) maintain that the positive impacts of trade intensity are
better realised when countries exhibit similar production structures. A different perspective
is offered by Ng (2010) who puts forward the argument that the effects of trade intensity
on business cycle synchronisation are stronger when countries specialise in different stages
of the production process. On a final note, Davis and Huang (2011) provide evidence to
support the view that changes in the terms of trade (i.e. the relative price of exports in
terms of imports) affect countries’ business cycles and their synchronisation.
The exchange rate channel, on the other hand, pertains to positive shocks in foreign
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economies which result in the depreciation of the local currency. Subsequently this could
lead to an increase of domestic country’s competitiveness and thus to an improvement of the
domestic trade balance. On the downside, this depreciation could also result in importing
inflation (Eickmeier, 2007).
Turning to the financial integration channel, this can bear both positive and negative
spillover effects. In particular, we maintain that financial markets and business cycles are
closely related and thus higher level of integration among financial markets could lead to
stronger spillover effects among business cycles. This is in line with Claessens et al. (2012)
who argue that disturbances in financial markets are associated with bust phases of busi-
ness cycles. The Great Recession of 2007–2009 is a representative example supporting this
argument. Furthermore, financial integration allows for greater capital mobility and in this
regard, capital flows from a domestic economy to a foreign economy may very well harm the
former and improve output levels in the latter (see, inter alia, Canova and Marrinan, 1998;
Imbs, 2004).
Finally, the confidence channel reflects the response of domestic agents to potential
spillovers deriving from foreign shocks to the local economy. In addition, the strength of
the spillover depends on whether agents over- or under-react to (asymmetric) information
about foreign shocks (Eickmeier, 2007).
Apparently, despite the fact that many studies have been carried out relating to busi-
ness cycle synchronisation (see, Artis et al., 2011; Antonakakis, 2012a; Lee, 2012; Crespo-
Cuaresma and Ferna´ndez-Amador, 2013; Degiannakis et al., 2014, among others) only a few
concentrate on the spillovers among business cycles per se (Yilmaz, 2009; Antonakakis and
Badinger, 2012; Michaelides et al., 2014). Even more so, only Michaelides et al. (2014), focus
on Europe. Thus, this study adds to the European business cycle literature by investigating
business cycle spillovers in a time-varying environment, purporting to explore how output
shocks are transmitted among EU15 member-countries.
Our empirical analysis is predicated upon the spillover index methodology developed by
Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012), which has already attracted significant attention by both
the economic and the finance literature (see, inter alia, McMillan and Speight, 2010; Yilmaz,
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2010; Buba´k et al., 2011; Antonakakis, 2012b; Zhou et al., 2012; Antonakakis and Vergos,
2013).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the application of
the spillover index approach and describes the data used. Section 3 presents the empirical
findings. Section 4 summarizes the results and concludes the study.
2. Empirical Methodology and Data
2.1. Spillover methodology
The spillover index approach introduced by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) builds on the
seminal work on VAR models by Sims (1980) and the well-known notion of variance decom-
positions. It allows an assessment of the contributions of shocks to variables to the forecast
error variances of both the respective and the other variables of the model. Using rolling-
window estimation, the evolution of spillover effects can be traced over time and illustrated
by spillover plots. For the purpose of the present study, we use the variant of the spillover
index in Diebold and Yilmaz (2012), which extends and generalizes the method in Diebold
and Yilmaz (2009).
Starting point for the analysis is the following P -th order, N -variable VAR
yt =
P∑
p=1
Θiyt−i + εt (1)
where yt = (y1t, y2t, . . . , yNt) is a vector of N endogenous variables, Θi, i = 1, ..., P, are
N ×N parameter matrices and εt ∼ (0,Σ) is vector of disturbances that are independently
distributed over time; t = 1, ..., T is the time index and n = 1, ..., N is the variable index.
Key to the dynamics of the system is the moving average representation of model (1),
which is given by yt =
∑∞
j=0Ajεt−j, where the N ×N coefficient matrices Aj are recursively
defined as Aj = Θ1Aj−1 + Θ2Aj−2 + . . . + ΘpAj−p, where A0 is the N × N identity matrix
and Aj = 0 for j < 0.
Following Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) we use the generalized VAR framework of Koop
et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998), which produces variance decompositions invariant
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to the variable ordering. According to this framework, the H-step-ahead forecast error
variance decomposition is
φij(H) =
σ−1jj
∑H−1
h=0 (e
′
iAhΣej)
2∑H−1
h=0 (e
′
iAhΣA
′
hei)
, (2)
where Σ is the (estimated) variance matrix of the error vector ε, σjj the (estimated) standard
deviation of the error term for the j-th equation and ei a selection vector with one as the i-th
element and zeros otherwise. This yields a N × N matrix φ(H) = [φij(H)]i,j=1,...N , where
each entry gives the contribution of variable j to the forecast error variance of variable i.
The main diagonal elements contain the (own) contributions of shocks to the variable i to
its own forecast error variance, the off-diagonal elements show the (cross) contributions of
the other variables j to the forecast error variance of variable i.
Since the own– and cross–variable variance contribution shares do not sum to one under
the generalized decomposition, i.e.,
∑N
j=1 φij(H) 6= 1, each entry of the variance decomposi-
tion matrix is normalized by its row sum, such that
φ˜ij(H) =
φij(H)∑N
j=1 φij(H)
(3)
with
∑N
j=1 φ˜ij(H) = 1 and
∑N
i,j=1 φ˜ij(H) = N by construction.
This ultimately allows to define a total (volatility) spillover index, which is given by
TS(H) =
∑N
i,j=1,i 6=j φ˜ij(H)∑N
i,j=1 φ˜ij(H)
× 100 =
∑N
i,j=1,i 6=j φ˜ij(H)
N
× 100 (4)
which gives the average contribution of spillovers from shocks to all (other) variables to the
total forecast error variance.
This approach is quite flexible and allows to obtain a more differentiated picture by
considering directional spillovers: Specifically, the directional spillovers received by variable
i from all other variables j are defined as
DSi←j(H) =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i φ˜ij(H)∑N
i,j=1 φ˜ij(H)
× 100 =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i φ˜ij(H)
N
× 100 (5)
and the directional spillovers transmitted by variable i to all other variables j as
DSi→j(H) =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i φ˜ji(H)∑N
i,j=1 φ˜ji(H)
× 100 =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i φ˜ji(H)
N
× 100. (6)
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Notice that the set of directional spillovers provides a decomposition of total spillovers into
those coming from (or to) a particular source.
By subtracting Equation (5) from Equation (6) the net spillovers from variable i to all
other variables j are obtained as
NSi(H) = DSi→j(H)−DSi←j(H), (7)
providing information on whether a country (variable) is a receiver or transmitter of shocks
in net terms. Put differently, Equation (7) provides summary information about how much
each variable contributes to the volatility in other variables, in net terms.
The spillover index approach provides measures of the intensity of interdependence across
countries and variables and allows a decomposition of spillover effects by source and recipient.
2.2. Data description
We collect monthly observations of industrial production as a proxy measure for eco-
nomic activity for each of the EU15 countries1 over the period 1977M1 – 2012M12 from
the International Financial Statistics (IFS) maintained by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). All series are seasonally adjusted. Given that we are interested in business cycles
interdependencies, we use the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtered series of the natural logarithm
of seasonally adjusted industrial production series (with a smoothing parameter of 129,600),
as this is the most common indicator of business cycles.2
[Insert Table 1 here]
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the business cycle series for each country. The
table suggests that business cycles of higher magnitude can be observed for Belgium, Finland,
1Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherland,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK.
2However, we have explored the robustness of our empirical findings by employing alternative measures
of business cycles, such as the band pass filter and the 12-difference growth rates of industrial productions,
and our results described below remain qualitatively similar.
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Greece, Ireland, Luxemburg, Denmark and Sweden. On the other hand, lower magnitude
can be found in Austria, France and the UK. All series’ distributions are leptokurtic and
exhibit negative skewness. The only exception is Sweden, where a positive skewness is
observed. The negative skewness indicates that bust phases of business cycles have a higher
magnitude compared to boom phases. This could potentially be attributed to the effect
of the two latest Euro Area (EA) recessions. Furthermore, all series apart from the one
concerning Portugal reveal non–normality. Finally, according to the ADF–test statistic, all
cycles are stationary.
3. Empirical findings
In this section we present the results from our empirical analysis, starting with the estimates
of the spillover index and its subindices, defined in Equations (4)-(7). We then consider the
time-varying nature of spillovers indices.
3.1. Spillover Indices
Table 2 presents the results of the spillover indices based on 24-month ahead forecast error
variance decompositions. Before discussing the results, however, we shall first describe the
elements of the table. The ij−th entry in Table 2 is the estimated contribution to the
forecast error variance of variable i coming from innovations to variable j (see Equation
(2)). Note that each variable is associated with one of the EU15 business cycles. Hence, the
diagonal elements (i = j) measure own–country spillovers of business cycles, while the off–
diagonal elements (i 6= j) capture cross–country spillovers of business cycles. In addition,
the row sums excluding the main diagonal elements (labeled ‘Directional from others’, see
Equation (5)) and the column sums (labeled ‘Directional to others’, see Equation (6)) report
the total volatility spillovers ‘to’ (received by) and ‘from’ (transmitted by) each variable. The
difference between each (off-diagonal) column sum and each row sum gives the net spillovers
from variable i to all other variables j (see Equation (7)). The total volatility spillover index
defined in Equation (4), given in the lower right corner of Table 2, is approximately equal to
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the grand off-diagonal column sum (or row sum) relative to the grand column sum including
diagonals (or row sum including diagonals), expressed in percentage points.3
[Insert Table 2 here]
Several interesting results emerge from Table 2. First, own–country business cycle spillovers
explain the highest share of forecast error variance, as the diagonal elements receive higher
values compared to the off-diagonal elements. For example, innovations to business cycles
in Greece explain 76.7% of the 24-month forecast error variance of business cycles in Greece,
while only 0.87% in Germany and 1.05% in France. However, innovations to business cycles
in Germany explain 21.86% of the 24-month forecast error variance of business cycles in
Germany, while only 1.16% in Greece and 8.29% in France. This is a preliminary evidence
that shocks originating from the Greek economy tend to be contained within the Greek
borders.
Second, Spain is the dominant transmitter of business cycle shocks followed by Luxem-
bourg, France, UK, Germany and Italy, while Portugal, Ireland, Finland, Austria and Greece
are dominant receivers of business cycles shocks in the EU15. These results are supported by
the ‘directional to others’ row and the ‘directional from others’ column in Table 2. They are
also supported by the net directional spillovers values, which measure the net spillovers from
country i to all other economies j, reported in the last column of Table 2. Specifically, Spain
is the dominant country in business cycle transmission with a net spillover of 155.81%4 to
all other countries’ business cycles followed by Luxembourg (42.09%), UK (40.98%), France
(12.55%) and Germany (0.26%), while Austria is the dominant net receiver of business cycle
shocks from all other countries’ business cycles with a net spillover of -69.08%, followed by
Finland (-37.50%), Denmark (-32.25%), Belgium (-26.08%), Sweden (-25.54%), Portugal (-
21.28%), Ireland (-15.88%), the Netherlands (-15.67%), Greece (-7.46%) and Italy (-0.95%).
3The approximate nature of the claim stems from the fact that the contributions of the variables in the
variance decompositions do not sum to one and have to be normalized (see Equation (3)).
4Note that according to the generalised spillover index approach of Diebold and Yilmaz (2012), directional
and net spillovers do not sum to 100%.
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The results for Luxembourg may at first glance seem implausible; however, Gaechter et al.
(2012) also report an unexpected strong influence of Luxembourg’s cyclical component on
the business cycles of other European economies. These results are of great importance as,
for instance, business cycle shocks in any individual EU15 country may have certain reper-
cussions for other countries and thus, it can be a good indicator of future changes in their
business cycles.
Third, and most importantly, according to the total spillover index reported at the lower
right corner of Table 2, which effectively distils the various directional spillovers into one
single index, on average, 54.47% of the forecast error variance in EU15 countries’ business
cycles comes from spillovers of shocks across countries, while the remainder can be explained
by own-country shocks.
In summary, the results reported in Table 2 suggest that, on average, both the total
and directional spillovers of business cycles within the EU15 countries were extremely high
during our sample period, denoting the high level of business cycle interdependencies.5
3.2. Spillover Plots
While the use of an average measure of business cycle spillovers provides a good indication of
business cycle transmission mechanism, it might mask interesting information on movements
in spillovers due to secular features of business cycles. Hence, we estimate the model in
Equation (1) using 60-month rolling windows and obtain the variance decompositions and
spillover indices.6 As a result, we obtain time-varying estimates of spillover indices, allowing
us to assess the intertemporal evolution of total and directional business cycle spillovers
within and between EU15 countries.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
5We have explored the robustness of our results using alternative n–month ahead forecast error variance
decompositions (12, 36 and 48 months) and the results remain qualitatively similar.
6Our results reported below remain robust to alternative choices of window length (i.e. 36, 48 and 72
months).
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Figure 1 presents the results for the time-varying total spillover index obtained from the 60-
month rolling windows estimation. Large variability in the total spillover index is, indeed,
present and the index is very responsive to extreme economic events. For instance, the
total spillover index reaches a peak during Euro Area (EA) recessions, e.g. during the
1980s, 1992–1993, 2008–2009, as well as, at the onset of the Great Recession of 2007–2009.
Furthermore, the index follows a decreasing trend starting at the beginning of 1980s and
reaches a minimum just before the ERM II 1992 crisis. The road to the introduction of the
Euro starts with a short-lived decline in spillovers between 1997 and 2001, and then follows an
increasing trend since the inception of the common currency. During the Great Recession,
business cycle spillovers reach unprecedented levels. In turn, the ongoing European debt
crisis keeps business cycle spillovers at very high levels. These results indicate that during
economic downturns, interdependencies across countries tend to increase significantly and
are in line with previous studies (Imbs, 2010; Yetman, 2011; Antonakakis, 2012a).
Despite results for the total spillover index being informative, they might discard di-
rectional information that is contained in the “Directional to others” row (Equation (5))
and the “Directional from others” column (Equation (6)) in Table 2. Figure 2 presents the
estimated 60-month rolling windows directional spillovers from each of the business cycles to
others (corresponding to the “Directional to others” row in Table 2), while Figure 3 presents
the estimated 60-month rolling windows directional spillovers from the others to each of the
business cycles (corresponding to the “Directional from others” column in Table 2).
[Insert Figure 2 here]
[Insert Figure 3 here]
According to these two figures, the bidirectional nature of business cycle spillovers between
the EU15 countries is evident. Nevertheless, they behave rather heterogeneously over time.
Specifically, according to Figure 2, only in the case of Greece and Spain directional spillovers
from each of these two countries’ business cycles exceed the 30% level, in the beginning and
during the EA recession of 2008–2009, respectively. Other than that, directional spillovers
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from or to each business cycle range between 5%–20%. Interestingly enough, the directional
spillovers deriving from all other EU economies to each individual business cycle appear to
remain constant over time at a level of 5% for all countries. This is suggestive of the fact
that business cycle shocks are spread evenly across individual countries.
A similar picture emerges when looking at the net directional spillover indices obtained
from the 60-month rolling window estimation. According to Figure 4, which plots the time-
varying net directional spillovers, we see that Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain and the UK
are mostly net transmitters of business cycles shocks during the sample period, while Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France and Germany are mainly at the receiving ends of net
business cycle transmissions. The picture is not clear for Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal
and Sweden. Nevertheless, Greece appears to be a significant net transmitter during the
period just before the introduction of the Euro (possibly due the uncertainty surrounding the
country’s non compliance with the convergence criteria laid out in the Maastricht Treaty)
and prior the EA recession of 2008–2009. Thought-provokingly, during the European debt
crisis, Greece’s business cycle is not a net transmitter, while Spain’s is. This is in line with
Michaelides et al. (2014) who maintain that the Greek business cycle does not Granger-
cause any of the other European business cycles. Finally, this finding also suggests that
the European debt problem may not actually originate in the Greek economy, as has been
anecdotally claimed by the press, but rather, it is rooted in the uncertainty stemming from
the turbulence in the Spanish economy. Possibly, there may be other channels (e.g. via
the financial sector) through which shocks in the Greek economy may have an impact on
European economies.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
3.3. Net Spillover Indices among Groups of Countries
To examine further the net spillover effects among the EU15 countries, we turn our attention
to net spillover effects among groups of countries, namely Eurozone core countries, Eurozone
peripheral countries and non-EMU countries. Figure 5 illustrates these net spillovers among
the three groups.
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[Insert Figure 5 here]
In principle, net spillovers tend to be of great magnitude between core and peripheral
Eurozone countries, followed by those between core and non-EMU countries. The lowest
magnitude of net spillovers is observed between the peripheral and non-EMU countries.
Starting with net spillovers among core and peripheral countries we observe that both groups
can either be net transmitters or net receivers of business cycles shocks at different time
periods. In particular, during the period between the late 80s and the early 90s (i.e. the
ERM II period), as well as, in the years that followed the introduction of the euro currency,
core countries can be credited with transmitting business cycles shocks to the Eurozone
periphery. By contrast, during the years that followed the collapse of ERM II and until
the introduction of the euro, as well as, the post-2007 period (which is characterised by two
EA recessions and the Great Recession of 2007–2009) peripheral countries were the main
transmitters of business cycles shocks to the core countries.
Possibly the intertemporal change in the nature (i.e. net transmitter or net receiver) of
each group can be explained by the transmission channels of business cycles shocks identified
by the literature. More specifically, these changes can be attributed to the trade channel,
the exchange rate channel, the financial integration channel, as well as, the confidence chan-
nel. The fact that core countries are the main transmitters during the ERM II period can
be explained by the dominant character of the German economy and by the fact that all
other countries pegged their currency to the Deutsche Mark and thus followed the German
monetary policy (see, for instance, Degiannakis et al., 2014). Thus, the transmission of
business cycles shocks during this period can be mainly explained via the exchange rate
channel. Turning to the Maastricht Treaty period, the effort put by peripheral economies to
meet the convergence criteria and thus qualify to member EMU states, serves as a plausible
explanation as to why peripheral countries are the net transmitters of the period (i.e. mainly
the trade channel of business cycles shocks transmission is identified here).
The following period; that is, the period after the adoption of the common currency
and until 2007, core countries become net transmitters and this can be explained by three
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transmission channels of business cycles shocks (i.e. the trade, the financial integration and
the confidence channel). In particular, adopting a common currency was conducive of the
intensification of the intra-EU trade, as well as, of the higher degree of financial integration
in Europe. The countries which led these developments in Europe were mainly the core
European countries. In addition, the confidence channel is potentially useful in explaining
the net transmitting character of core European countries. More explicitly, expectations
deriving from peripheral countries regarding the growth potential of core countries and
Europe in general, acted as positive shocks in these economies.
Furthermore, results for the later period of our study (i.e. the post–2007 period) imply
that the same three transmission channels are also present. More specifically, the fact that
peripheral countries become net transmitters comes as no surprise as the GIIPS (i.e. Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) were heavily affected by the economic turbulence during
the aforementioned period. Their economic conditions resulted in lower trade activity with
core European countries and also confidence for these economies waned during the crisis
leading to higher levels of uncertainty throughout Europe. In addition, this high uncertainty
resulted in a greater sovereign risk premia not only for the beleaguered peripheral economies
but also for stronger Eurozone economies such as France (see, for instance, Antonakakis and
Vergos, 2013), leading to negative economic developments even in stronger economies. The
fact that increased increased risk premia have spilled over to core European countries can
be explained by the increased integration of the European financial sector.
Turning to the net spillovers between core and non-EMU countries, we observe that the
former are the main transmitters, apart from the period 2011–2012 when non-EMU countries
become net transmitters of business cycles shocks. This could potentially be attributed to
economic conditions in the UK. Similarly, the main net transmitters between peripheral and
non-EMU countries are the former. It is worth noting that the magnitude of net spillovers
effects is higher during the last two EU recessions, as well as, in the period between them.
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3.4. Cumulative Generalised Impulse Response Functions
We now proceed with the analysis of the generalised cumulative impulse response functions
which will allow us to identify the direction of the response to and the bottom line effects
of business cycle shocks. Figures 6, 7 and 8 illustrate the cumulative generalised impulse
responses of output growth in each of the EU15 countries to output shocks originating in
Eurozone core, Eurozone peripheral and non–EMU countries, respectively.
As far as shocks from Eurozone core countries are concerned, Figure 6 reveals that
responses from all countries tend to be highly similar. However, there are two exceptions.
Shocks originating from Austria and Belgium seem to lead to the decoupling of their business
cycles mainly with those in the periphery and non–EMU countries. EU15 responses to
shocks deriving from peripheral countries are alike (see, Figure 7); however, the magnitude
of these response is higher for shocks originating in Italy and Spain. This is anticipated
considering that these are the two largest economies of the European periphery. Finally,
Figure 8 presents the responses to shocks deriving from non–EMU countries. In principle all
responses to both Swedish and UK output shocks are positive although magnitude appears
to be higher for core countries as opposed to peripheral countries. On the contrary, Danish
output shocks result in the decoupling of its business cycle with the remaining EU countries.
[Insert Figure 6 here]
[Insert Figure 7 here]
[Insert Figure 8 here]
We further our analysis by providing a summary picture of the bottom line effect of busi-
ness cycle shocks. To achieve that, we calculate for each country the cumulative effects of
a one–standard deviation shock to business cycle on the respective country’s business cycle,
referred to as ‘within–country’ response, and the cumulative effects of a one–standard devi-
ation shock to business cycle on the other country’s business cycle, referred to as ‘between–
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country’ response.7 Table 3 reports the averages of the cumulative effects i) of business
cycle shocks on within–country business cycle, and ii) of business cycle shocks on between–
country, for the full sample period and for each group of countries (Eurozone core, Eurozone
periphery and non–EMU). The cumulative effects are reported for time horizons of 12, 24, 36
and 48 months. As the effects of business cycle shocks have fully materialized after 4 years
(see, Figures 6–8), the cumulative 48–month responses can be interpreted as overall bottom
line effects of incipient shocks including spillover effects and the associated repercussions.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Overall, all shocks have positive and multiplicative effects suggesting a positive (negative)
shock in a country leads to a positive (negative) response in other countries. In terms of the
within–country effects, we observe fairly low and of similar magnitude cumulative responses
for all three groups. In particular, the within–periphery responses amount to 3.9% followed
by those of within–core (3.447%) and within–non–EMU (3.358%). Of particular interest
are the cumulative response effects between–countries. First, own group shocks matter less
than cross group shocks. Put differently, responses are more sizeable to other group shocks
as opposed to own group shocks. For instance, the response of core countries business cycles
to shocks originating in the core are lower (10.589%) compared to their responses to shocks
originating in the periphery (16.096%) and non–EMU countries (15.930%). A similar pattern
is also observed in the periphery and non–EMU responses to own– and cross–group business
cycle shocks. Second, the largest in magnitude cumulative response effects is observed for
the non–EMU to shocks in the core (24.938%), while the lowest are the responses of non–
EMU to own–group shocks (2.134%). Third, the responses of core countries to shocks in the
periphery are higher than the other way around suggesting that shocks in the periphery are
crucial determinants of core countries business cycles. Fourth, the responses of Eurozone
core to shocks in the non–EMU are sizeable (15.93%) and can be attributed to the effects
7Notice that with a stationary VAR the cumulative effects of one–time business cycle shock have to be
interpreted as level effects and should not be confused with permanent effects on the business cycle.
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of the UK business cycle to Eurozone core countries. This result is in line with the fact the
UK is shown to be a key net transmitter of business cycle shocks during the sample period.
4. Conclusions
This study investigates the business cycle spillover effects in EU15 countries over the
period 1977–2012. In particular, it contributes to the understanding of the relationship
among European business cycles fluctuations. Monthly industrial production observations
are considered to be a proxy for EU15 countries’ GDP, while their cyclical components are
extracted from the HP filter.
Our main findings can be summarised, as follows. According to the total spillover index,
54.57% of the forecast error variance in all EU15 countries’ business cycles can be explained
by cross–country spillovers. Using 60–month rolling windows we obtain time–varying esti-
mates of the spillover index. We find that the index exhibits large intertemporal variability
while it can be very responsive to economic events, such as downturns of economic activity.
With regard to directional spillovers over time, prominent among our findings is that
only in the case of Spain and Greece does the level of these spillovers exceed the relatively
high level of 30%. That aside, most business cycles shocks are evenly spread across all other
individual countries. However, if we turn our focus to the recent European debt crisis, it
appears that it is Spain which is the dominant transmitter of business cycle shocks among
the EU15 countries, while shocks in the Greek business cycle are primarily confined within
the country’s borders. Given the magnitude of the spillovers of the period originating in the
Spanish economy, it could be suggested that it is the Spanish business cycle, rather than
the Greek, that can be credited with bolstering the European debt crisis.
As far as core Eurozone countries, peripheral Eurozone countries, as well as, non–EMU
countries are concerned, net spillovers tend to be of greater magnitude between core and
peripheral Eurozone countries. In addition, evidence suggests that the net transmitting or
net receiving character of each group of countries is time–specific. This intertemporal alter-
nation in the direction of the spillovers regarding each group can be explained by the various
transmission channels of business cycle shocks that have been reported by the literature and
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mainly pertain to developments relating to the terms of trade, the level of financial integra-
tion, exchange rate dynamics, as well as, the underlying confidence of economic agents.
We also provide evidence suggesting that non–EMU countries have been net receivers of
business cycles shocks from either core or peripheral Eurozone countries for the most part
of the sample period. It should be noted however, that between the years 2011 and 2012,
non–EMU countries appear to have contributed to the transmission of business cycle shocks
to core Eurozone countries.
Additional evidence further implies that output shocks in each one of the core Eurozone
countries tend to give rise to similar output responses from all other EU15 countries, with
the exception of Austria and Belgium. In addition, output shocks in peripheral Eurozone
countries also result in similar output responses from all other EU15 countries; however,
the responses from Italy and Spain appear to be of greater magnitude. In addition, core
Eurozone countries’ output responses tend to be bigger – compared to the responses of
peripheral Eurozone countries – when it comes to non–EMU output shocks. Finally, the
cumulative response effects are more sizeable to cross group shocks compared to shocks
originating from own group business cycles.
Overall, this study provides new insights on the transmission mechanism and the feedback
effects of business cycle shocks in Europe. Prominent among our results is the fact that
peripheral countries such as Spain (mainly) and Portugal and Greece (at a secondary level)
exhibit a rather net–transmitting character when it comes to business cycles shocks in the
years that followed the onset of the Great Recession. In this regard, shocks originating in the
business cycles of peripheral Eurozone countries are very important for the EU15 economic
conditions. This finding stresses the importance of adopting – at both the national and the
international level – the appropriate policy measures; that is, measures aiming to steer the
peripheral economies on an even keel, away from turbulence and close to recovery.
As an avenue of future research, our analysis of business cycle shock transmission mech-
anisms could be extended to include additional channels, such as the financial sector, trade
and the uncertainty channel.
19
References
Altavilla, C., 2004. Do EMU members share the same business cycle? Journal of Common Market Studies
42 (5), 869–896.
Angeloni, I., Dedola, L., May 1999. From the ERM to the euro: new evidence on economic and policy
convergence among EU countries. Working Paper Series 0004, European Central Bank.
Antonakakis, N., 2012a. Business cycle synchronization during us recessions since the beginning of the 1870s.
Economics Letters 117 (2), 467–472.
Antonakakis, N., 2012b. Exchange return co-movements and volatility spillovers before and after the intro-
duction of euro. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money 22 (5), 1091–1109.
Antonakakis, N., Badinger, H., 2012. International spillovers of output growth and output growth volatility:
Evidence from the G7. International Economic Journal 26 (4), 635–653.
Antonakakis, N., Vergos, K., 2013. Sovereign bond yield spillovers in the Euro zone during the financial and
debt crisis. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money 26, 258 – 272.
Artis, M., Chouliarakis, G., Harischandra, P. K. G., 2011. Business cycle synchronization since 1880. Manch-
ester School 79 (2), 173–207.
Backus, D. K., Kehoe, P. J., Kydland, F. E., 1993. International business cycles: Theory vs. evidence.
Quarterly Review 17 (4), 14–29.
Baxter, M., King, R. G., 1999. Measuring business cycles: Approximate band-pass filters for economic time
series. The Review of Economics and Statistics 81 (4), 575–593.
Belo, F., 2001. Some facts about the cyclical convergence in the Euro zone. Working Papers w200107, Banco
de Portugal, Economics and Research Department.
Buba´k, V., Kocenda, E., Zikes, F., 2011. Volatility transmission in emerging european foreign exchange
markets. Journal of Banking & Finance 35 (11), 2829–2841.
Burns, A. F., Mitchell, W. C., September 1946. Measuring business cycles. NBER Books. National Bureau
of Economic Research, Inc.
Calderon, C., Chong, A., Stein, E., 2007. Trade intensity and business cycle synchronization: Are developing
countries any different? Journal of International Economics 71 (1), 2–21.
Canova, F., Ciccarelli, M., Ortega, E., 2012. Do institutional changes affect business cycles? Evidence from
Europe. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 36 (10), 1520–1533.
Canova, F., Dellas, H., 1993. Trade interdependence and the international business cycle. Journal of Inter-
national Economics 34 (1-2), 23–47.
Canova, F., Marrinan, J., 1998. Sources and propagation of international output cycles: Common shocks or
transmission? Journal of International Economics 46 (1), 133–166.
Claessens, S., Kose, M. A., Terrones, M. E., 2012. How do business and financial cycles interact? Journal
20
of International economics 87 (1), 178–190.
Clark, T. E., van Wincoop, E., 2001. Borders and business cycles. Journal of International Economics 55 (1),
59–85.
Crespo-Cuaresma, J., Ferna´ndez-Amador, O., 2013. Business cycle convergence in EMU: A first look at the
second moment. Journal of Macroeconomics 37 (C), 265–284.
Darvas, Z., Szapry, G., 2008. Business cycle synchronization in the enlarged EU. Open Economies Review
19 (1), 1–19.
Davis, J. S., Huang, K. X., 2011. International real business cycles with endogenous markup variability.
Journal of International Economics 85 (2), 302–316.
De Pace, P., 2013. Currency union, free-trade areas, and business cycle synchronization. Macroeconomic
Dynamics 17, 646–680.
Degiannakis, S., Duffy, D., Filis, G., 2014. Business cycle synchronization in EU: A time-varying approach.
Scottish Journal of Political Economy. In press.
Diebold, F. X., Yilmaz, K., 2009. Measuring financial asset return and volatility spillovers, with application
to global equity markets. Economic Journal 119 (534), 158–171.
Diebold, F. X., Yilmaz, K., 2012. Better to give than to receive: Predictive directional measurement of
volatility spillovers. International Journal of Forecasting 28 (1), 57–66.
Eickmeier, S., 2007. Business cycle transmission from the US to Germany – A structural factor approach.
European Economic Review 51 (3), 521–551.
Fatas, A., 1997. EMU: Countries or regions? Lessons from the EMS experience. European Economic Review
41 (3-5), 743–751.
Fidrmuc, J., Korhonen, I., 2006. Meta-analysis of the business cycle correlation between the Euro area and
the CEECs. Journal of Comparative Economics 34 (3), 518–537.
Gaechter, M., Riedl, A., Ritzberger-Gruenwald, D., 2012. Business cycle synchronization in the Euro area
and the impact of the financial crisis. Monetary Policy & the Economy (2), 33–60.
Gayer, C., 2007. A fresh look at business cycle synchronisation in the Euro area. Directorate General Eco-
nomic and Monetary Affairs 287, European Commission.
Gertler, M., Gali, J., Clarida, R., 1999. The science of monetary policy: A new keynesian perspective.
Journal of Economic Literature 37 (4), 1661–1707.
Gomez, D. M., Ortega, G. J., Torgler, B., Jan. 2012. Synchronization and diversity in business cycles: A
network approach applied to the European Union. CREMA Working Paper Series 2012-01, Center for
Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
Gouveia, S., Correia, L., 2008. Business cycle synchronisation in the Euro area: the case of small countries.
International Economics and Economic Policy 5 (1-2), 103–121.
21
Gregory, A. W., Smith, G. W., 1996. Measuring business cycles with business-cycle models. Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control 20 (6-7), 1007–1025.
Hallett, A. H., Richter, C., 2008. Have the Eurozone economies converged on a common European cycle?
International Economics and Economic Policy 5 (1), 71–101.
Imbs, J., 2004. Trade, finance, specialization, and synchronization. The Review of Economics and Statistics
86 (3), 723–734.
Imbs, J., 2010. The first global recession in decades. IMF Economic Review 58 (2), 327–354.
Inklaar, R., Jong-A-Pin, R., de Haan, J., 2008. Trade and business cycle synchronization in OECD countries–
A re-examination. European Economic Review 52 (4), 646–666.
Koop, G., Pesaran, M. H., Potter, S. M., 1996. Impulse response analysis in nonlinear multivariate models.
Journal of Econometrics 74 (1), 119–147.
Kose, M. A., Otrok, C., Whiteman, C. H., 2003. International business cycles: World, region, and country-
specific factors. American Economic Review 93 (4), 1216–1239.
Kose, M. A., Yi, K.-M., 2006. Can the standard international business cycle model explain the relation
between trade and comovement? Journal of international Economics 68 (2), 267–295.
Kuznets, S., 1958. Long swings in the growth and population and in related economic variables. Proceedings
of the American Philsophical Society 102, 25–52.
Lee, J., 2012. Measuring business cycle comovements in Europe: Evidence from a dynamic factor model
with time-varying parameters. Economics Letters 115 (3), 438–440.
Lee, J., 2013. Business cycle synchronization in Europe: Evidence from a dynamic factor model. International
Economic Journal 27 (3), 347–364.
Lehwald, S., 2012. Has the Euro changed business cycle synchronization? Evidence from the core and the
periphery. Empirica, 1–30.
Lumsdaine, R. L., Prasad, E. S., 2003. Identifying the common component of international economic fluc-
tuations: A new approach. Economic Journal 113 (484), 101–127.
McKinnon, R. I., 1963. Optimum currency areas. The American Economic Review 53, 717–725.
McMillan, D. G., Speight, A. E., 2010. Return and volatility spillovers in three euro exchange rates. Journal
of Economics and Business 62 (2), 79–93.
Michaelides, P. G., Papageorgiou, T., Tsionas, E. G., 2014. Is the Greek crisis in the EMU contagious?
Applied Economics Letters 21 (1), 13–18.
Michaelides, P. G., Papageorgiou, T., Vouldis, A. T., 2013. Business cycles and economic crisis in Greece
(1960-2011): A long run equilibrium analysis in the Eurozone. Economic Modelling 31 (C), 804–816.
Mitchell, W. C., 1927. Business cycles: The problem and its setting. NBER Books. National Bureau of
Economic Research, Inc.
22
Mundell, R. A., 1961. A theory of optimum currency areas. The American Economic Review 51, 657–665.
Ng, E. C., 2010. Production fragmentation and business-cycle comovement. Journal of International Eco-
nomics 82 (1), 1–14.
Papageorgiou, T., Michaelides, P. G., Milios, J. G., 2010. Business cycles synchronization and clustering in
Europe (1960–2009). Journal of Economics and Business 62 (5), 419–470.
Pesaran, H. H., Shin, Y., 1998. Generalized impulse response analysis in linear multivariate models. Eco-
nomics Letters 58 (1), 17–29.
Rogoff, K., 1985. The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 100 (4), 1169–89.
Savva, C. S., Neanidis, K. C., Osborn, D. R., 2010. Business cycle synchronization of the Euro area with the
new and negotiating member countries. International Journal of Finance & Economics 15 (3), 288–306.
Sims, C., 1980. Macroeconomics and reality. Econometrica 48, 1–48.
Weyerstrass, K., Aarle, B., Kappler, M., Seymen, A., 2011. Business cycle synchronisation with(in) the Euro
area: in search of a Euro effect. Open Economies Review 22 (3), 427–446.
Yetman, J., 2011. Exporting recessions: International links and the business cycle. Economics Letters 110 (1),
12–14.
Yilmaz, K., 2009. International Business Cycle Spillovers. Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research
Forum Working Papers 0903, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
Yilmaz, K., 2010. Return and volatility spillovers among the East Asian equity markets. Journal of Asian
Economics 21 (3), 304–313.
Zhou, X., Zhang, W., Zhang, J., 2012. Volatility spillovers between the Chinese and world equity markets.
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 20 (2), 247–270.
23
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of EU15 member countries’ business cycles (1977M1–2012M12)
Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera ADF
AUT 0.0006 0.0966 -0.1822 0.0421 -0.8912 5.4412 164.453*** -5.7831***
BEL 0.0001 0.2876 -0.2113 0.0550 -0.0742 6.0878 172.022*** -4.8235***
FIN 0.0009 0.1846 -0.2471 0.0574 -1.0612 6.4572 296.226*** -8.6035***
FRA 0.0001 0.1021 -0.1897 0.0341 -1.3124 8.5516 678.775*** -6.8192***
GER 0.0002 0.1377 -0.2784 0.0522 -1.6536 9.5262 963.507*** -5.6856***
GRC -0.0003 0.2601 -0.2200 0.0479 -0.2012 6.4308 214.778*** -4.8636***
IRL 0.0000 0.2159 -0.1928 0.0615 -0.1178 3.6000 7.479** -5.2326***
ITA -0.0003 0.1291 -0.2613 0.0515 -1.1378 7.5525 466.268*** -4.9293***
LUX 0.0011 0.2343 -0.2975 0.0721 -0.3696 5.0228 83.484*** -5.6229***
NED 0.0000 0.1230 -0.2136 0.0402 -0.5152 5.3632 119.642*** -5.4161***
PRT 0.0019 0.1616 -0.1357 0.0447 -0.0221 3.3387 2.100 -6.0440***
ESP 0.0006 0.0983 -0.2162 0.0428 -1.2669 7.2864 446.280*** -7.8837***
DNK -0.0009 0.2397 -0.2412 0.0675 -0.1462 3.7811 12.522*** -5.6222***
SWE -0.0004 0.3787 -0.2375 0.0667 0.1855 8.1273 475.678*** -5.5813***
UK 0.0000 0.0808 -0.1197 0.0312 -0.9379 4.8262 123.368*** -5.6223***
Note: ADF denotes Augmented Dickey Fuller tests with 10%, 5% and 1% critical values of -2.5704, -2.8682
and -3.4457, respectively. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3: Generalised cumulative impulse responses (1977M1–2012M12)
Cumulative response1)
From (j)
Within–country Between–country
To(i) Core Periphery Non-EMU Core Periphery Non-EMU
12-months
Core 3.209 8.531 12.145 13.324
Periphery 3.360 13.715 3.926 5.607
Non-EMU 2.977 22.727 9.994 0.524
24-months
Core 3.417 10.255 14.990 15.406
Periphery 3.795 15.312 4.822 7.127
Non-EMU 3.303 24.913 11.364 1.399
36-months
Core 3.429 10.464 15.760 15.769
Periphery 3.871 15.324 4.993 7.425
Non-EMU 3.345 24.789 11.314 2.044
48-months
Core 3.447 10.589 16.096 15.930
Periphery 3.900 15.470 5.078 7.535
Non-EMU 3.358 24.938 11.376 2.134
Notes: 1) Cumulative generalized impulse response to one standard deviation shock, multiplied by 100 (in
%).
All entries are averages over country-specific shocks to the respective business cycle.
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Figure 1: Total spillover of business cycles in the EU15
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Note: Grey shaded areas denote EA recessions based on CEPR business cycle dating committee.
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Figure 2: Directional spillovers FROM each of the EU15 business cycles to all others
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Note: Grey shaded areas denote EA recessions based on CEPR business cycle dating committee.
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Figure 3: Directional spillovers TO each of the EU15 business cycles from all others
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Note: Grey shaded areas denote EA recessions based on CEPR business cycle dating committee.
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Figure 4: Net spillovers of business cycles in the EU15
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Figure 5: Net spillovers of business cycles among Eurozone core, Eurozone periphery and non–EMU
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Note: Grey shaded areas denote EA recessions based on CEPR business cycle dating committee.
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Figure 6: Cumulative impulse responses of output growth in the EU15 countries to shocks from the Eurozone
core
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Figure 7: Cumulative impulse responses of output growth in the EU15 countries to shocks from the Eurozone
periphery
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Figure 8: Cumulative impulse responses of output growth in the EU15 countries to shocks from non–EMU
countries
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